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Abstract
State governments …nance their expenditures with multiple tax instruments, so when collec-
tions from one source decline, they are typically compensated by greater revenues from other
sources. This paper addresses the important question of the extent to which personal and cor-
porate income taxes are used to compensate for sales tax ‡uctuations within the U.S. states.
The results show that one percent increase in the sales tax rate is associated with a half and a
third percent decrease in the personal and corporate income tax rates respectively. In terms of
tax revenues per capita, the results show that a one percent increase in the sales tax revenue per
capita is associated with a 3 percent and a 0=9 percent decrease in the corporate and personal
income tax revenue per capita respectively. On average then, an exogenous reduction of $4=5
in the sales tax revenue per capita is compensated, ceteris paribus, with an increase of either
$3=4 in the collections per capita from corporate taxes or $3=6 in the ones from personal income
taxes.
JEL: H71, H21
Keywords: Tax Mix, State Taxes, Instrumental Variables.
¤Departmento de Economía y Administración, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile (Email:
agostini@uahurtado.cl)
yI am grateful to Jim Hines and Roger Gordon for all their valuable comments. All the remaining errors are mine.
1"...other taxes will more than compensate for lost sales taxes."
S. Kroes, Vice President for California Taxpayers’ Association1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main sources of tax revenue for state governments are sales taxes and personal and corporate
income taxes. Nearly all states use a mix of these tax instruments to …nance their expenditures
and they do face some exogenous shocks that a¤ect the collections from one of these taxes. Then,
if state governments want to keep providing the same level of public goods and services as before,
they must compensate the e¤ects of these shocks changing the revenue collected from other taxes.
There are several examples of exogenous shocks that impact state tax revenues. In the case of
sales taxes, concrete examples of negative shocks are the e¤ects of internet sales and the increase in
household spending on services, which are mainly not taxed.2 T h ei m p a c to fs o m eo ft h e s es h o c k s
might be quite signi…cant, the estimated total state and local revenue loss due to e-commerce, for
example, was $13.3 billion for 2001 (Bruce and Fox (2001)). In the case of income taxes, most
states use the federal de…nition of adjusted gross income as the basis for their income taxes. As
a consequence, many federal tax reforms include provisions that constitute exogenous shocks that
impact state tax revenues. The federal tax law enacted on May 28 of 2003, for instance, introduced
several changes that will reduce state collections from income taxes. Speci…cally, the taxation of
dividends and capital gains was reduced, the bonus depreciation tax break for corporations was
extended and expanded3, and the maximum expensing bene…t for small business investment was
1Cal-Tax Digest, October 1999.
2Between 1970 and 2001, consumption of services rose from 31% to 44% of total household purchases.
3The 2002 federal tax law permitted …rms to deduct up to 30% of the cost of acquiring machinery or equipment
2increased4. Again, the impact of some of these shocks is not negligible. The estimated loss in state
income tax revenue due to the changes in the bonus depreciation and the maximum expensing
bene…t are $1.1 billion and $600 million in 2004, respectively (Johnson (2003)).
Additionally, the tax mix is also in‡uenced by states needs to increase revenue for two reasons.
First, to counterbalance the declines in federal expenditures; and, second, to meet citizens demands
for reductions in property taxes subsidized by higher state funding of local expenditures.
Considering that most states collect the larger part of their tax revenues from a combination
of income and sales taxes, we can think that they basically choose between increased dependence
on one or the other when they want to increase or compensate revenues. It is also important to
recognize that the optimal mix of tax revenue sources to use is not a once in a while decision. As
pointed out by Zodrow (1999) "In some sense, all states must continually choose between sales and
income taxes, as they always have the option of changing the mix of the taxes utilized. Moreover,
many states face this choice in a very immediate sense, as they are under considerable pressure
to …nd additional tax revenues". As a result, all the exogenous shocks and the states pressure to
compensate declines in revenues might have important e¤ects on the tax mix over time. In fact,
the states tax mix has been changing quite signi…cantly during the last 20 years and an important
and open question then, is what the degree of substitution is among these taxes.
Figure 1 shows the average state tax rates during the period 1980-1998 for the three main taxes
used by the U.S. state. As can be seen from the …gure, the average tax mix of the U.S. states has
been changing over time. The sales tax rate and the top statutory corporate tax rate has been
in the …rst year, as long as the item was bought between September 2001 and September 2004. The new tax law
increased the percentage to 50% and extended the period to December 2004.
4The new law increased the maximum deduction from $25,000 to $100,000
3Figure 1:










1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
year
sales tax personal tax corporate tax
slowly increasing and the top statutory personal income tax rate has been decreasing, even though
it has ‡uctuated more. If the tax revenue per capita collected from di¤erent sources is considered,
which somehow includes the base of the taxes too, the trend is somewhat di¤erent and provides
a complementary story to the tax rates mix. Figure 2 shows the average state tax revenues per
capita during the period 1980-1998. The revenue per capita collected from corporate income taxes
decreased by around one third during the early 80s and has been almost constant since then, even
if the average statutory tax rate has been slowly increasing. The revenue per capita collected from
personal income and sales taxes has been steadily increasing during this period, the latter more
than the former, even though the average personal tax rate has decreased and the sales tax rate
has been steadily increasing.
4Figure 2:
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Obviously, these …gures show just averages and not too many conclusions can be drawn from
them, but they show that the average state tax mix has been changing over time and exploring the
interdependence of di¤erent taxes within the tax mix is the goal of this paper.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2.2 considers the optimal tax problem of a state gov-
ernment when three di¤erent taxes can be used and one of them can be imposed on goods that are
also consumed by foreign citizens. Section 2.3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 2.4 shows and interprets the empirical results, and Section 2.5 concludes.
52 The State Government Optimal Tax Problem
In the section I use a standard optimal commodity tax model with the purpose of understanding
how di¤erent taxes are interrelated and how the tax mix is a¤ected when there is an exogenous
shock that a¤ects directly one of the taxes used. Even though a commodity tax model is just an
approximation to the actual taxes that American states use, it can provide qualitative lessons that
allow a better understanding of the empirical results of this paper.
Following the optimal commodity tax literature (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972), Auerbach (1985)), we can consider a state in which all consumers are identical,
they have no exogenous income and take consumer prices s for the q +1available goods as given.
The producer prices t are assumed …xed and the good zero is a numeraire with price s0 =1 .T h e
government may use excise taxes on q goods to raise a …xed required revenue U.
The state government’s problem is then to maximize the utility of the representative consumer
subject to its revenue constraint and the consumer conditions for utility maximization. This max-
imization problem can be written as:
max
s Y (s) (1)
v=w=
w{ ¸ U (2)
6The Lagrangian and the …rst order conditions of this problem are:













5 =0 8l (4)
Using the envelope theorem to substitute CY
Csl for ¡{l (where  is the consumer’s marginal
utility of income), the Slutsky equation, and de…ning:























where V is the Slutsky matrix excluding good zero. Now, the optimal taxes can be obtained by







7If it is assumed that the matrix V is diagonal (all cross-e¤ects are zero), the Ramsey inverse





where %ll = vll(sl@{l) are compensated own-price elasticities. Under this assumption, the
choice of the untaxed good might be quite relevant, because it may be more reasonable to assume
no cross e¤ects among taxed goods when labor is the numeraire than when another good is. As
pointed out by Auerbach (op. cit.), labor (or minus leisure) is usually chosen as a numeraire in
most of the models but this does not imply that the government cannot tax labor5. We know that
state governments do actually tax labor income, and the most common untaxed goods are usually
the goods considered "necessities" (food, medicines and clothes). Consider then the case of four
goods, where the three taxed goods are labor, consumption and capital, and the numeraire is the
consumption of necessities. This is a case in which the zero cross e¤ects assumption might not be
a reasonable one, especially between labor and consumption, and, therefore, the optimal taxes are
better characterized by the system of equations (8) with at least v12 = v21 6=0 .6
The analysis up to this point is basically the standard optimal tax theory with a di¤erent
choice of the numeraire good. Let’s consider now two di¤erent aspects of the problem. First, I
will introduce consumption by foreign citizens. In an open economy, even if the state governments
want to maximize the utility of their own citizens, several goods might be bought and consumed
5Some authors choose leisure as the numeraire claiming the inability of the government to tax leisure, but as
Auerbach (op. cit.) states : "[the government] can tax leisure purchases (labor supply)".
6The three main taxes used by the U.S. states are sales, personal income, and corporate income. The use of an
optimal commodity tax framework might not be the most appropriate for corporate income taxes, but the goal of
the paper is to show and estimate the interdependence of di¤erent state taxes and this model must be understood,
as in Mirrlees (1975), just as an approximation.
8by people who live in a di¤erent state7 and this should a¤ect the optimal taxes. Why is the
consumption of foreign citizens relevant? Recall that this paper is about tax interdependence and
the main goal is to estimate the e¤ects of a change in a state sales tax on the other taxes within the
same state. However, all state taxes are set simultaneously and instrumental variables are needed
to consistently estimate these e¤ects. In this context, the role of foreign consumption is just the
role of an instrumental variable that allows to identify the coe¢cient of endogenous explanatory
variables. Second, I will consider the optimal solution in terms of revenues instead of tax rates.
The main reason for this, is that state governments can actually change not only tax rates, but also
tax bases. The relevant parameter that states may consider then, when setting their tax policies,
is the fraction of revenue or the revenue per capita they collect from each di¤erent tax.
Considering again the case where the three taxed goods are labor, consumption and capital,
and the numeraire is the consumption of necessities, where, now, consumption goods can be bought
also by consumers from out of the state. The state government problem can be written as:
max
w1>w2>w3








+ w2{2 + w3{3 ¸ U
where {1 and {
i
1 are quantities of good one purchased by domestic and foreign residents respec-







, the fraction of good 1 purchases by foreign citizens, this problem can
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The Lagrangian of this problem and the …rst order conditions characterizing internal choices of
t1,t 2,a n dt 3 are:











































5 =0 iru l=2 >3 (14)
Using the Slutsky equation, the envelope theorem to substitute CY
Csl for ¡{l (where  is the
consumer’s marginal utility of income), and de…ning:






































{l iru l=2 >3 (16b)
The left-hand side of these equations can be interpreted as the compensated change in the
demand for good l, meaning a change in the demand for good l that would result if the consumer
were compensated to stay in the same indi¤erence curve (and vlm were constant).8 In this particular
case the compensated change in the demand for good 1 is adjusted by 1@(1 ¡ ) to take into account
the e¤ect of foreign demand for good 1. For interpreting the right-hand side, it is important to
recall why the consumer’s marginal utility of income, , di¤ers from the social marginal utility of
income, . The reason is that an additional dollar given to the consumer increases his utility in
two ways: a direct e¤ect captured by  (the consumer has more income to spend) and an indirect
e¤ect captured by the second term in  (the additional expenditure increases revenue). As usual,
 represents the shadow cost (in terms of utility) of raising an additional dollar of revenue and,
therefore, the term ( ¡ ) measures the marginal excess burden of the tax, the bene…t of switching
from optimal indirect taxes to lump-sum taxes. In general, if revenue is positive, ( ¡ ) ¸ 0.9, 10
When  =0 , the optimal solution suggests setting taxes in such a way that an equiproportional
reduction in the demand for all goods is attained. When A0, the optimal solution implies a
8Samuelson ( 1951).
9The Slutsky matrix is negative semide…nite. Using this property it can be shown that
¡
 ¸ 0 and
¡(1¡)
(1¡) ¸ 0
when revenue is positive.
10Additionally, if revenue is nondecreasing in income,  ¸ .
11higher proportion in the demand reduction of good 1.
In the case of good 1, the …rst order condition show that the marginal excess burden per dollar
of revenue raised is ( ¡ (1 ¡ ))@(1 ¡ ), which is greater than ( ¡ )@, the marginal excess
burden from taxing goods 2 and 3. The intuition behind this result is very simple, a fraction of
the excess burden imposed by taxing good 1 is borne by foreign consumers and, therefore, the
government should tax good 1 proportionally more than goods 2 and 3.
The three …rst order conditions can be stacked to have the following system of equations:
e Vw = ¡P{ (17)
where e V is a modi…ed Slutsky matrix excluding good zero (necessities), w is the tax vector, P
is a diagonal matrix, and { is the commodity vector.11 Again, the optimal taxes can be obtained
by inverting the modi…ed Slutsky matrix and multiplying both sides of (17) by e V¡1:
w¤ = ¡e V¡1P{ (18)




























12tion than the one made to obtain the Ramsey inverse elasticity rule), we have:12
e V¡1 =
2
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Obviously, in the case in which v12 = v21 =0and  =0we get the Ramsey inverse elasticity
rule as the optimal solution (equations (9a)). If we keep the zero cross-e¤ects assumption but A0
the solution is the same as before for w2 and w3, but the proportionality factor of w1is bigger. In
the extreme case in which  =1 ,t h eo p t i m a lw1is not proportional but equal to
s1
%11,w h i c hi st h e
highest point on the La¤er curve for that tax. Therefore, under the no cross-e¤ects assumption a
higher level of  implies a higher tax on good 1.
Now, going back to the case in which v12 = v21 6=0 , we can see from the solution that a change
in  has a direct e¤ect on the optimal tax for goods 1 and 2 and an indirect e¤ect, through  and
, on the optimal taxes of all goods. The direct e¤ect of  on tax 1 implies that t1 is an increasing
function of . This e¤ect means that if  increases and , ,a n dvlm remain constant, then the
optimal w1 will increase. The intuition, again, is that if a bigger fraction of the excess burden of










13the tax is borne by foreigners then the government can raise the same revenue as before imposing
ah i g h e rb u r d e no ng o o d1 .T h ed i r e c te ¤ e c to f on w2 is ambiguous and depends on the sign of
v21.I fg o o d s1a n d2a r es u b s t i t u t e s( c o m p l e m e n t s ) ,v21 will be positive (negative) and the optimal
w2 will increase (decrease) if  increases.
L e tc o n s i d e rn o wt h ei n d i r e c te ¤ e c t so ft h ec h a n g ei n on the tax rates through  and .
The e¤ect of  on  should be negative. Recall that  represents the marginal cost of raising
an additional dollar of revenue, then this cost should be lower when  increases because a bigger
fraction of the excess burden is borne by foreign consumers. The change in  has direct and indirect
e¤ects on . The direct e¤ect (change in  when  changes, assuming everything else constant) is
positive13, which means that the marginal social utility of income increases when the fraction of
good 1 purchases by foreign consumers increases. The indirect e¤ects on  are less obvious and
it is di¢cult to know the sign of them. There are indirect e¤ects through  and .T h e e ¤ e c t
through  should be negative assuming that the marginal utility of income is a decreasing function
of income and, as it was already discussed, the e¤ect through  should be also negative. Therefore,
the total e¤ect of  on  is ambiguous (the direct e¤ects is positive and the indirect e¤ects should
be negative).
Finally, the net e¤ect of a change in  on w1 is ambiguous, because the direct e¤ect is positive
and the indirect e¤ects are ambiguous. In general, it is di¢cult to know the sign of the e¤ects of a
change in  in all tax rates. Intuitively, we can think that a change in  will a¤ect the tax rate on
good 1 directly, and given that the amount of revenue to be collected is constant, the tax rates on







14t h eo t h e rt w og o o d ss h o u l dc h a n g et o o .E v e ni fw ek n o wt h es i g no ft h ee ¤ e c to nw1, it is still not
clear what would happen with the other tax rates. If the government, for example, increases w1 as
a result of an increase in , the total revenue would increase. Hence, to keep revenue constant it
can then either decrease the other two tax rates or increase one and decrease the other one.14






¡[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]%22 +(  ¡ )%12







[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]%33%22 ¡ ( ¡ )%12%33
( ¡ )(%11%22 ¡ %21%12)
(22)
Now, consider the e¤ect of an exogenous increase in , the fraction of foreign consumption of
good 1.15 The total e¤ect of this change in  on expressions (21) and (22) will depend on the
direct e¤ect through  and the indirect e¤ects through  and .16 I nt h ec a s eo fe x p r e s s i o n( 2 1 )
the direct e¤ect of  implies an increase or decrease in the ratio of the two taxes depending on
weather [ ¡ (1 ¡ )](%22%21 ¡ %21%22) 7 ( ¡ )(%11%22 ¡ %21%12), and the sign of the indirect
e¤ects through  and  are ambiguous. Therefore, the sign of the total e¤ect is indeterminate. If
we look now at expression (22), we can see that the direct e¤ect of an increase in  is positive17,
which means that the tax rate on good 1 would increase relative to the tax rate on good 3. Again,
14Mathematically, although it does not o¤er much insight, the comparative static result with respect to  can be
derived using the implicit function theorem.
15I am assuming that the increase in  i sd u et oa ni n c r e a s ei nc o n s u m p t i o nb yf o r e i g nc o n s u m e r s ,w h i l ed o m e s t i c
consumption remains constant.
16The change in  might also a¤ect the substitution terms of the Slutzky matrix, which means that there are also
e¤ects through %11, %22, %33, %12,a n d%21. However, the elasticities are usually assumed to remain constant in this
type of analysis (Ramsey (1927), Samuelson (1951)).
17The term (%11%22 ¡ %21%12) is positive because the matrix ~ V is negative semide…nite.
15it is di¢cult to know the sign of the indirect e¤ects through  and . We know that the e¤ect on
 is positive18 a n dt h ee ¤ e c to nt h et e r m(1 ¡ ) is negative.19 H o w e v e r ,t h es i g no ft h et o t a l
e¤ect is again indeterminate.
Equations (21) and (22) are obviously ratios of two tax rates and tax rates are positive numbers,
therefore, both ratios must be positive. However, equations (21) and (22) can be estimated having
w2
s2 and w3
s3 on the left hand-side, respectively, and w1
s1 on the right hand-side. In this case, the
coe¢cient on w1




other explanatory variables, the right hand-side of equations (21) and (22) would be captured by
the coe¢cient on w1
s1 in the regressions. Let’s call this coe¢cient  and consider the implications of
its sign.
In the case of equation (21) we would have that:
¡[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]%22 +(  ¡ )%12 =  [[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]%21 ¡ ( ¡ )%11] (23)
After some manipulation we have,
( ¡ )(%12 + %11) ¡ [ ¡ (1 ¡ )](%22 + %21)=0 (24)
Now, given that ( ¡ ) A 0 and [ ¡ (1 ¡ )] A 0, equation (24) can be satis…ed only if
(%12 + %11) and (%22 + %21) have the same sign. Furthermore, given that ( ¡ ) ? [ ¡ (1 ¡ )]







19Multiplying equation (15) by (1 ¡ ) and keeping , ,a n dw constant:
C(1¡)





16it is also needed that j%12 + %11j A j%22 + %21j. There can be two cases then:
Case 1:
%12 +%11 A 0 and %22 +%21 A 0. The former condition implies that if A0 then %12 A 0 and
if %12 ? 0 then ?0.20 The latter condition implies that vljqf%21g = vljqfg.
Case 2:
%12 + %11 ? 0 and %22 + %21 ? 0. The former condition implies that if ?0 then %12 ? 0.
Now, in the case of equation (22), given that the denominator of the right hand-side is positive,
we have:
vljqf[ ¡ (1 ¡ )]%33%22 ¡ ( ¡ )%12%33g = vljqfg (25)
After some manipulation,
vljqf( ¡ )(%22 ¡ %12)%33 + %33%22g = vljqfg (26)
which implies that if ?0 then %12 ? 0 and j%12j A j%22j.I f%12 A 0 then A0.
vljqf%22 ¡ %12g = vljqfg (27)
Given that %22 ? 0, condition (27) implies that vljqf%12g = vljqfg.
Finally, recall that %12 is the compensated elasticity of consumption with respect to personal
income taxes and %21 is the compensated elasticity of labor with respect to the sales tax. If labor
and consumption are complements these elasticities should both be negative, which implies that a
20Recall that ( ¡ ) A 0, A0, A0>% 33 ? 0,a n d%22 ? 0.
17negative  should be expected from the regressions.
Alternatively, for analyzing the ratio of two taxes we could use the fact that
P
m=0 smvlm =0 ,i n






[ ¡ (1 ¡ )](%20 + %21)+(  ¡ )%12







¡%30([ ¡ (1 ¡ )](%20 + %21)+(  ¡ )%12)
( ¡ )(%10%20 + %10%21 + %12%20)
(29)
A sc a nb es e e nf r o me x p r e s s i o n( 2 8 ) ,w h e n =0we have the standard result (Corlett and
Hague (1953) and Harberger (1964)) that the government should set a higher tax on the good that
is the relative complement of the numeraire (%l0 is smaller). When A0,w eh a v eaw e i g h t e ds u m
of compensated elasticities and it is less clear which tax rate should be higher. Now, we can have
t h ec a s ei nw h i c h%10 is smaller than %20, for example, and still have a higher tax rate on good 2.21
3D a t a
I collected …scal, economic and demographic data for the 50 U.S. states over the period 1980-
1998. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of these data.
All the tax rates variables (sales tax rate, corporate tax rate, and personal tax rate) are statutory
state tax rates. In the case of corporate income and personal income taxes I use the top statutory
tax rate. However, it is not always clear what the statutory tax rate is and I had to use my
judgment to de…ne one. In the case of personal income taxes there are two circumstances in which
21When  =0, %10 ?% 20 implies w1 Aw 2.
18Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Sales Tax Rate 0.0428 0.0176 0 0.08 950
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0673 0.0296 0 0.138 950
Personal Tax Rate 0.0594 0.0379 0 0.17 950
Sales Tax Rev. per capita 0.4474 0.2351 0 1.3519 950
Corp. Tax Rev. per capita 0.1125 0.1989 0 3.8388 950
Pers. Tax Rev. per capita 0.4081 0.2719 0 1.3066 950
Income Per Capita 224534 3879.25 13997.4 37338 950
Unemployment 6.4177 2.1629 2.4 18 950
Poverty 13.4932 4.1339 2.9 27.2 950
Balanced Budget 0.5315 0.4992 0 1 950
Expenditure Limit 0.3589 0.4799 0 1 950
Revenue Limit 0.1094 0.2134 0 1 950
Grants Per Capita 0.7095 0.2767 0.3196 4.005 950
Fraction GSP Hotel 0.0132 0.0236 0.00274 0.2042 950
Elder 65 12.1327 2.1861 3 18.6 950
Population 4945.42 5327.9 402 32667 950
this happens. First, some states tax personal income using a percentage of the federal income tax
liability, in which case I multiply that percentage by the top statutory federal tax rate to obtain the
state tax rate.22 Second, some states tax only interest and dividends, in which case I considered
the tax rate to be zero. In the case of corporate income taxes, there are two states that impose a
tax that is somewhat di¤erent: Michigan and Texas. Michigan, since 1976, uses a single business
tax, imposing a ‡at rate on the sum of federal taxable income of the business, compensation to
employees, dividends, interest and royalties paid. Texas, since 1991, uses a franchised tax on earned
surplus, de…ned as the federal income tax apportioned to the state. In both cases I consider the
tax rate on these taxes as a top statutory tax rate on corporate income tax.
The tax revenue per capita variables are the total revenue collected (in millions) from each tax
22For example, Vermont in 1997 taxed personal income with a 25% of the federal income tax liability and the top
statutory federal tax rate was 39.6%. I set the tax rate equal to 9.9% then.
19divided by the total population of the state.
The variable Income per capita is the state personal income per capita in dollars, as calculated
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, de‡ated by the U.S. GDP price de‡ator. The variable
unemployment is the state unemployment rate as percentage of the civilian labor force, estimated by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The variables poverty, population and elder 65 are the percentage of
persons in the state below the poverty level, the state population in thousands, and the percentage
of the population above 65 years old respectively, all of them as estimated by the U.S. Census
Bureau.
State governments face several statutory constraints when designing their budgets. Several
states face expenditures and/or revenue limitations, which constrain the annual growth of them
either to a …xed rate or to one based on one or more of the following variables: in‡ation rate,
population growth, growth of personal income, and ratio of revenue to personal income. Many states
also have statutory or constitutional requirements to balance their budgets. The two most common
requirements are that the governor must submit a balanced budget and that the legislature must
pass a balanced budget. Using information from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations and the Book of the States, I constructed a set of dummy variables for capturing the
e¤ects of these budget limits. The variables Expenditure Limit and Revenue Limit are a dummy
equal to one if the state has a constitutional or statutory provision that constraints the annual
growth of expenditures or revenues respectively, and zero otherwise. The variable Balanced Budget
is equal to one if the state legislature must pass a balanced budget, and zero otherwise.
The variable Grants Per Capita is the amount, in dollars, of federal grants received by each
state divided by the state’s population as reported by The Council of State Governments, de‡ated
20by the U.S. GDP price de‡ator.
One of the di¢culties of estimating the e¤ects of one tax on another one within the same state
is that state governments set all taxes simultaneously. Therefore, the sales tax rate, for example, is
correlated with the error term in the tax setting equation of the other taxes. A potential solution
for this problem is the use of instrumental variables. In this particular case, for identifying the
e¤ects of each tax on one another it would be necessary to have at least on instrument for each
tax, which is a hard task. In the theoretical analysis I used , the fraction of total consumption by
foreign citizens in each state, as a variable that would a¤ect the sales tax rate directly but not the
other taxes. A reliable measure of  can be a suitable instrument if it is highly correlated with the
sales tax (rate or fraction of revenue) and not correlated with unobserved variables that determine
personal and corporate income taxes. As a proxy for  I use the variable Fraction GSP Hotel,
which is the fraction of the state gross product that corresponds to the hotels and lodging industry
(SIC code 70), according with the Bureau of Economic Analysis.23 T h eu s eo ft h ef r a c t i o no fG S P
that comes from lodging as an instrumental variable for the sales tax allows identifying the e¤ects
of the sales tax on personal and corporate income taxes.24
23There exist some alternatives proxies for the state sales to foreign citizens that I could not use. The Travel Industry
Association of America, for example, calculates the impact of international visitor spending on state economies, but it
is available for only few years. The Census Bureau reports the number of visitors each state receives, but is available
only for some states and also for few years.
24One potential concern with the use of this instrument is that the fraction of GSP from hotels and lodging can be
capturing several things non related at all with the actual number of visitors or the expenditures of foreign citizens
in each state. As a way to explore this possibility I ran a regression using the fraction of GSP from lodging as
a dependent variable and the other measures described in the previous footnote (international travel expenditures,
number of international visitors) for which I have few observations. The results show that the fraction of GSP from
hotels is not only strongly and positively correlated with these alternative measures, but it also explains around 45%
of the variation. The results of these regressions are shown in the Appendix.
214R e s u l t s
4.1 Tax Rates
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the relationship between the corporate income and
sales tax rates. The …rst column shows the results when OLS state …xed-e¤ects are used for the
estimation. The coe¢cient of the sales tax rate is positive and signi…cant. The elasticity of the
corporate tax rate with respect to the sales tax rate is, at mean values, 0=2. The second column
shows the results of estimating the same equation when instrumental variables are used. As can be
seen from the table, when the endogeneity of the sales tax rate is taken into account in the estimation
the coe¢cient changes dramatically. Even though the coe¢cients of most of the variables are very
similar as before, now the coe¢cient of the sales tax rate is negative and signi…cant. Evaluated
at mean values, now the elasticity of the corporate tax rate with respect to the sales tax rate is
¡0=306. Hence, a one percent increase in the sales tax rate of a state is associated with a roughly
one-third percent decrease in the corporate income tax rate of the same state, ceteris paribus.
The variable income per capita is negative and signi…cant, showing that states where the popu-
lation is richer have lower corporate income taxes. Evaluated at mean values, a one percent increase
in income per capita is associated with a 0=52 percent decrease in the corporate tax rate. The co-
e¢cient of unemployment is positive and non-signi…cant. My prior was a negative sign for this
variable because states with high unemployment rates may want attract investment to generate
more jobs. It is possible that this e¤ect might be captured by the poverty rate, which is negative
and signi…cant. A one percent increase in the poverty rate of a state is associated, at mean values,
with a 0=085 percent decrease in the corporate tax rate of the state.
22Table 2: Sales Taxes and Corporate Income Taxes
Corporate Tax Rate OLS IV
Sales Tax Rate 0.314 -0.478
(0.053) (0.212)






Balanced Budget -0.0008 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Expenditure Limit 0.0032 0.0029
(0.0010) (0.0011)






Fixed E¤ects yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes
N 950 950
Wald Chi2 81388.7
F7 . 8 9
R2 0.1900 0.1797
Among the budget limit set of dummies, only the limits on the growth of expenditures and
revenues were signi…cant. I expected a negative sign for these two variables because a state govern-
ment facing a binding limit on its expenditures and /or revenues would need to raise less revenue
than otherwise, which would imply lower tax rates. Surprisingly, both have a positive coe¢cient
showing that these limits are associated with higher corporate income taxes. There are two poten-
tial explanations for this. First, these limits on expenditures and/or revenues are annual limits that
state governments face every year independently of what happened the previous year. Therefore,
23if the limit was not binding for one year the extra room for increasing revenues or expenditures
during that year cannot be carry forward to the next year. State governments then have incen-
tives to hit the limits every year and the data is showing that the states with limits do increase
taxes to reach the limit every year. A second possible explanation is that the regression is mainly
capturing the cross-sectional variation of these limits because they do not vary much over time.
It is quite reasonable to think that these limits on the growth of expenditures and revenues were
imposed primarily in states with higher taxes and, therefore, the regression is showing this positive
cross-sectional correlation between taxes and statutory limits.25 The variable balanced budget,
even though not signi…cant, has a positive coe¢cient as I expected. If the legislature of a state
must pass a balance budget it has to either increase taxes or reduce expenditures, which implies a
non-negative correlation with tax rates.
The coe¢cient of population is negative and non signi…cant. Population usually captures the
level of business activity and therefore it might be considered a proxy for the base of the tax in this
case. A negative sign then, shows that an increase in the tax base is associated with a decrease in
the tax rate (the causality could go either way of course).
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the relationship between the personal income tax rate
and the sales tax rate. When OLS …xed e¤ects are used for the estimation, the coe¢cient on the
sales tax rate is positive but statistically non signi…cant. The elasticity of the personal tax rate
with respect to the sales tax rate, calculated at mean values, is 0=06. If instrumental variables
25This explanation opens the possibility that these limits be endogenous and, therefore, the estimated coe¢cients
in the regression are biased. Several of these limits are constitutional limits and were imposed more than 50 years
ago, so they are probably not correlated with the tax rates of the last 15 years. Nevertheless, I estimated the same
regression without using the budget limit dummies as a comparison and the results were very similar.
24are used instead, the coe¢cient becomes negative and signi…cant. Evaluated at the means, the
elasticity of the personal tax rate with respect to the sales tax rate is ¡0=466.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,ao n e
percent increase in the sales tax rate of a state is associated with a roughly half percent decrease
in the personal income tax rate, ceteris paribus.
Table 3: Sales Taxes and Personal Income Taxes
Personal Tax Rate OLS IV
Sales Tax Rate 0.0688 -0.6474
(0.1091) (0.3303)






Balanced Budget -0.0025 -0.0019
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Expenditure Limit 0.0050 0.0049
(0.0020) (0.0021)
Revenue Limit 0.00037 0.0024
(0.0026) (0.0015)






Fixed E¤ects yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes
N 950 950
Wald Chi2 18442.4
F5 . 0 4
R2 0.1214 0.1054
The coe¢cient of income per capita is negative and signi…cant at 10% only, showing that more
a­uent states have lower top statutory tax rates on personal income. The elasticity of the corporate
tax rate with respect to income per capita is ¡0=078 at mean values.
25The e¤ects of unemployment and poverty are signi…cant and with opposite signs. Higher unem-
ployment rates are associated with higher personal tax rates and higher poverty rates with lower
ones. The magnitude of the e¤ects is small, a one percent increase in the unemployment rate and a
one percent increase in the poverty rate are related to a 0=09 percent increase and a 0=0004 percent
decrease in the personal tax rate respectively.
Expenditure Limit is the only budget limit variable that is signi…cant at 5%. Its coe¢cient is
positive, as in the case of corporate income taxes, showing that states with statutory requirements
that limit their annual growth of expenditures tend to have higher personal tax rates. The variable
Revenue Limit is positive but signi…cant only at 10% and Balanced Budget is negative but non
signi…cant.
The variable Elder 65 has the expected sign, states with higher fractions of elder people in the
population have higher personal taxes, but it is not signi…cant. The coe¢cient on population is
positive, non signi…cant at 5% but statistically signi…cant at 10%. A one percent increase in the
state population is related to a 0=03 percent increase in the personal tax rate. The e¤ect is then
the opposite as the one on corporate taxes, a higher level of business activity is related to higher
personal tax rates.
Table 4 shows the …rst-stage regression of the instrumental variables regressions (the …rst-stage
regression is identical for the two instrumental variables regressions shown in the second column of
tables 2 and 3).
The variable Fraction GSP Hotel is positive as expected and signi…cant, showing that a higher
fraction of the state product corresponding to hotels and lodging is associated with higher sales
tax rates. A one percent increase in the fraction of the GSP corresponding to hotel and lodging is
26related to a 0=034 percent increase in the sales tax rate of the state. If this variable is a good proxy
for the fraction of consumption of foreign citizens in the state, this result is consistent with some
empirical …ndings of the tax competition literature. If a neighbor of state l, say state m,i n c r e a s e s
its sales tax rate, the citizens of state m will engage in cross-border shopping with state l and this
will increase the fraction of consumption by foreign citizens in state l. As a result, state l can now
increase its sales tax rate to collect some extra revenue, reduce some other taxes, and somehow
"export" some of the burden of its taxes.
The coe¢cient of the fraction of elder people is negative and signi…cant, con…rming the intuition
that states with a higher fraction of elder people in the population have lower sales tax rates. The
magnitude of the impact is quite important, a one percent increase in the fraction of the population
older than 65 years old is associated, at mean values, with a 0=57 percent decrease in the sales tax
rate.
The variable Grants Per Capita was never signi…cant in any of the regressions and the results
did not change when it was excluded, so I dropped it from the …nal speci…cation. I also consider the
following variables that might a¤ect the tax setting decision of a state government: percentage of
the state population voting democrat in the closest presidential election, the ratio of state debt to
state product, state debt per capita, the fraction of the population that are high school graduates
and, a dummy variable equal to one if the state has a statutory or constitutional provision requiring
a supermajority voting to increase taxes. However, they were never signi…cant and the results were
b a s i c a l l yi d e n t i c a li ft h e yw e r ei n c l u d e do rn o t .
Finally, it is important to mention that one concern with the use of tax rates as dependent
variables is that they are bounded within zero and one. However, even if the sample contains
27Table 4: First-Stage Regression
Sales Tax Rate OLS

























several zero tax rates26, the regressions do not predict negative tax rates at all for the case of
corporate income and sales tax and just two for the case of personal income tax. For this reason,
and following everybody else in the tax literature I decided not to use a Tobit model to estimate
the regressions.
26Over the whole period 1980-1998, there are …ve states (10% of the sample) with no sales tax, four (8% of the
sample) with no corporate income tax, and nine (18% of the sample) with no personal income tax.
284.2 Tax Revenues
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the relationship between the tax revenue per capita
from corporate taxes and the tax revenue per capita from sales taxes. When OLS are used for
the estimation, the coe¢cient of the sales tax revenue per capita is negative but not signi…cant. If
instrumental variables are used to correct for the endogeneity of the sales tax revenue per capita,
the coe¢cient is again negative, but statistically signi…cant and almost twenty times bigger in
absolute value. The elasticity, at mean values, between the corporate tax revenue per capita and
the sales tax revenue per capita is ¡3=01 . Hence, a one percent increase in the sales tax revenue per
capita is associated with a 3% decrease in the corporate tax revenue per capita. The mean values
of corporate income and sales tax revenues per capita in the sample are $113 and $448 respectively.
Therefore, a $4.5 increase in the sales tax revenue per capita is associated with a $3.4 reduction in
the corporate income tax revenue per capita, everything else constant.
The coe¢cient for income per capita is positive and signi…cant. The elasticity with respect
to income per capita, at mean values, is 11=98. Hence, a one percent increase in the income per
capita is associated with almost a 12% increase in the revenue per capita collected from corporate
i n c o m et a x e s . T h em e a ni n c o m ep e rc a p i t ai nt h es a m p l ei s$ 2 2 , 4 5 4a n dt h em e a nr e v e n u ep e r
capita from corporate taxes is $113. Therefore, an increase of $225 in the income per capita of a
state is associated, on average, with a $3.4 increase in the corporate taxes revenue per capita. The
variables unemployment and poverty are both negative and statistically insigni…cant.
Although all the budget limit dummies are negative, only the variable expenditure limit is
signi…cant, showing that states facing a constraint in the rate of growth of their expenditures
29Table 5: Corporate Tax Revenue Per Capita
Corporate Tax Revenue per capita OLS IV
Sales Tax Revenue per capita -0.0348 -0.7568
(0.0836) (0.3601)






Balanced Budget -0.007 -0.0026
(0.0146) (0.0154)
Expenditure Limit -0.0757 -0.0602
(0.0213) (0.0234)
Revenue Limit -0.0202 -0.0312
(0.0276) (0.0292)






Fixed E¤ects yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes
N 950 950
Wald Chi2 752.31
F5 . 0 7
R2 0.1356 0.1293
collect lower revenue per capita from corporate taxes.
The coe¢cient for population is positive and signi…cant, even though the magnitude of the
e¤ect is somewhat small. A one percent increase in the population of a state is associated, at mean
values, with a 1=32% decrease in the revenue per capita that is collected using corporate taxes.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the relationship between the revenues per capita
collected from personal income taxes and sales taxes. The …rst column show the results when OLS
30…xed e¤ects are used for the estimation. As can be seen from the table, the coe¢cient of the sales
tax revenue per capita is negative but insigni…cant. The second column shows the results when
instrumental variables are used in the estimation to control for the endogeneity of the sales tax
revenue per capita. The coe¢cient on the sales tax revenue per capita is again negative, but now is
signi…cant and almost twenty time bigger in magnitude. The elasticity, calculated at mean values,
is ¡0=89. Hence, a one percent increase in the revenue per capita collected from sales taxes is
associated with a 0=9% percent decrease in the revenue per capita collected from personal taxes.
The mean values of the sales and personal income tax revenues per capita are $448 and $408
respectively. Therefore, a $4.5 increase in the sales tax revenue per capita is related to a $3.63
decrease in the personal income tax revenue per capita, ceteris paribus.
The variable income per capita is positive and signi…cant, showing that wealthier states collect
larger revenues per capita from personal income taxes. A one percent increase in the income per
capita of a state is related, at mean values, to a 2=8 percent increase in the state tax revenue per
capita that comes from personal taxes.
The coe¢cient for unemployment is positive but non statistically signi…cant. The coe¢cient
for poverty is also positive, but signi…cant. The positive relationship between poverty rate and the
amount of revenue per capita collected from personal taxes might be due to redistributive purposes,
even though the e¤ect is somewhat small. A one percent increase in the poverty rate is associated
with a 0=11 percent increase in the revenue per capita collected through personal income taxes.
The balanced budget dummy is positive and non signi…cant. The expenditure and revenue limit
dummies are both positive and signi…cant at 5% and 10% respectively. States that face constraints
on the growth of their expenditures and/or revenues in their budgets collect larger tax revenue per
31Table 6: Personal Tax Revenue Per Capita
Personal Tax Revenue per capita OLS IV
Sales Tax Revenue per capita -0.0473 -0.8184
(0.0403) (0.1985)






Balanced Budget -0.0004 0.0043
(0.0070) (0.0085)
Expenditure Limit 0.0267 0.0432
(0.0103) (0.0129)
Revenue Limit 0.0412 0.02939
(0.0133) (0.01613)






Fixed E¤ects yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes
N 950 950
Wald Chi2 28127.04
F6 1 . 2
R2 0.6543 0.5093
capita from personal taxes than states that do not face those constraints.
The variable Elder 65 is negative but, contrary to what I expected, not signi…cant. The coe¢-
cient for population is negative but also statistically not di¤erent from zero.
Table 7 shows the …rst-stage regression of the instrumental variables regressions (the …rst-stage
regression is again identical for the two IV regressions previously shown).
The variable Fraction GSP Hotel is again positive, as expected, and signi…cant, showing that a
32Table 7: Firs-Stage Regression
Sales Tax Revenue per capita OLS























F4 7 . 8 4
R2 0.5967
higher fraction of the GSP corresponding to hotels and lodging is correlated with higher sales tax
revenues per capita. A one percent increase in the fraction of the GSP from hotels and lodging is
associated with a 0=15 percent increase in the revenue per capita collected from sales tax.
The coe¢cient for the variable Elder 65 is negative and signi…cant, showing that the revenue
per capita collected from sales taxes is lower in states with a higher proportion of elder people in
the population. A one percent increase in the fraction of the population older than 65 years old is
associated, at mean values, with a 0=5 percent decrease in the revenue per capita that comes from
33sales taxes.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence in the literature has shown that the …scal policy of a U.S. state is in‡u-
enced by the …scal policies of its neighbors. In the same way, it is natural to think that decisions
regarding one instrument of …scal policy in‡uence the decisions regarding other available instru-
ments within each state. Speci…cally, I think that state governments do not set taxes considering
one tax at a time or each di¤erent tax based only on its own e¤ects, but rather consider a full
tax package, setting all taxes simultaneously. An important question then, is how one speci…c tax
a¤ects the other taxes within the same state. This paper attempts to address this question empir-
ically. Using instrumental variables I estimate the e¤ect of sales taxes on personal and corporate
income taxes within a state. The results show that one percent increase in the sales tax rate is
associated with a 0=47 and a 0=3 percent decrease in the personal and corporate income tax rates
respectively. In terms of revenues, the results show that a one percent decrease in the revenue
per capita collected from sales taxes is associated with a 3 and 0=9 percent increase in the revenue
per capita collected from corporate and personal income taxes respectively. At mean values, the
revenue results imply that an increase of $4.5 in the sales tax revenue per capita is associated with
a decreased of $3.4 in the corporate income tax revenue per capita or a $3.63 decreased in the
personal income revenue per capita.
The importance of these results is that they show not only that taxes are in fact interdependent
within one jurisdiction, but also that state governments try to keep their expenditures constant
34and for that purpose they compensate the decline in revenues from one tax increasing the revenues
from other taxes. A natural extension of this paper is to estimate the e¤ects of all the three taxes
among themselves, …nding for this purpose suitable instruments for the corporate and personal
income taxes. Even more interesting, though much more di¢cult, would be to also include excise
taxes, which represent a non negligible fraction of state tax revenues.
6 Appendix
Table 8: Fraction of GSP from Hotels and Accomodations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Visitors p.c. 0.00607 0.0074 0.0066
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0032)
Expenditures. p.c. 0.00056 0.0037 0.0013
(0.00014) (0.0010) (0.0016)
R2 0.4524 0.1080 0.4580 0.2283 0.3946
F 1.49 7.63 15.43 4.46 4.49
n 174 250 129 129 129
The variable Expenditures p.c. is the amount (in millions) of international visitor expenditures
per capita and contains data for 50 states for the years 1980, 1990, 1994, 1996 and 1997.
The variable Visitors per capita contains data for 46 states for the years 1980, 1996, and 1998
(not all years for each state).
The models (3) and (4) are identical to models (1) and (2) respectively, but they are estimated
using the same observations of model (5) to make the regressions comparable.
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